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New Haven, Connecticut 
l 
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 71 
I 
TECHNOLOOICAL TRANSFER, .BMPW'lME)1l' AND DEVELOPMENI (REVISED) 
J.c.a. Fei 
Gustav Ranis 
August 1, 1969 
Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials 
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical 
comnent. References in publications to Discussion 
Papers should be cleared with the author to protect 
I the tentative character of these papers. 
I. 
Technological Transfer. Employment and Development* 
It is generally agreed that one of the most important factors 
shaping the course of development in the typical less developed country 
(LDC) is its coexistence with developed countries (DC's)·and the possibilj~y 
of technologica 1 transfers from the latter to the former, induced by the 
presence of a so-called technology gap. In practical terms, such trans-
fers result in a modification of the ways in which the developing economy I I:! labor 
force is utilized in the course of development and are likely to induce major 
(· 
changes in the output Elnd employment performance of the system. Our p~­
pose in the present paper is to attempt an analysis of technological 
transfer and LDC employment and output generation,in the context of a 
1 
fairly general growth-theoretic framework. 
The dimensions cited of course go to the heart of the so-called 
LDC unemployment problem. Whether open or disguised, unemployment is a 
quantitatively significant phenomenon in most contemporary LDC's, and 
is exacerbated and accentuated even in areas with a relatively less un• 
favorable initial resource endowment. by cont.in1dng population pressures. 
It is an empirical fact that unemployment has been on the rise in the 
developing world, including in countries which have had a fairly satis• 
factory growth performance over the last two decades. For example, 
Arthur Lewis found that open unemployment rates in Jamaica during the 
so•s stayed up while real output doubled. 1 Professor Turner concluded 
that "in a group of 14 less developed countries for which there are 
*John C.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis. The authors are Professors of 
Economics, Yale University• 
. 
1w. A. Lewis, Development Planning, (New York: Harper &~Rew, 
1966), p. 78. 
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usable unemployment series back to the late 1950's, the total of kncwn 
unemployed has since been growing at an average of 8 1/2 per cent year.'' l a 
Moreover, even 1£ we were successful in curbing LDC population growth as 
of today\the developing world would have to face the political and social, 
as well as the economic, consequences of a formidable labor force ex­
plosion well into the 1 801 s. Small wonder that development economists 
and practitioners alike are becoming increasingly concerned with this 
problem. 2 
I 
In spite of this concern, we've made relatively little progress 
towards a positive theory of unemployment for the developing world--mainly 
l because it is a relatively complicated phenomenon, centrally related to 
both capital accumulation and technological change. 
3 
While capital accumula-
tion can be traced to the conventions 1 sources of saving and investment,
I. the causation behind technological change includes not only the aforemen­
I tioned transfer of technology from abroad, but also the even more complicated 
I innovative response and learning processes within. In Section I we shall 
discuss the conventional capital accumulation dimensions of the problemt 
I and its relationship to unemployment. Sections II and III will be devoted 
I respectively, to an analysis of the technological transfer and learning 
¾I. A. Turner, Can Wages by Planned, paper prepared for the Con­
ference on The Crisis in Planning, Sussex, June/July 1969, p. 7. 
2see, for example, w. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning • .22.• cit.; :W. 
Baer and M. Herv~, "Employment and Industrialization in Development Countri~s,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1966; "Employment in Less Developed
Countries: A First Look at the Size of the Problem", OECD Development '. 
Center, preliminary, April, E69; and recent "Work ·by th~ ILO, UNIDO and AID. 
lrhis contrasts sharply -with the highly developed theory of un• 
employment for the mDture economy in· the Keynesian tradition. The essence 
of the Keynesian theory is that unemployment results £rem an excess of 
pr~uctive capacity relative to aggregate demand; such a theory J~ -C?learly
irrelevant to ~ developing country where, as we shall show, unemployment 
occurs because.the productive capacity is too small relative to aggregate
demand. 
I 
dimensions of the problem. An integration of these facets into a compre­
hensive deterministic model will be attempted in Section IV. The applica-
tions of the model are discussed in Section V and its relevance 
tested against Japanese historical data in Section VI. 
I. Capital Accumulation and Unemoloyment 
"I It is intuitively obvious that unemployment in an LDC can occur 
t simply because of the inadequacy of the capital stock to absorb the 
I available labor force. A rigorous statement of this idea is due to 1Eckaus who first formulated the concept of "technical unemployment." 
f 
I 
• In Diagram la, let labor (capital) be plotted on the horizontal (verti• 
cal) axis and let the L-shaped production contours be shown with the 
"technology line" ar. Now suppose the factor endowment is at point E ,
0 
below the technology line. Then technical unemployment a la Eckaus
I of U •units occurs. This is due to the assumed essentially complemen­
tary nature of Kand L, i.e., technical unemployment occurs because theI 
o 
existing capital capacity of K units can accommodate only M units of 
Cl 0 
labor. Hence unemployment is induced by a shortage of capital stock. 
Introducing the time dimension, it follows rigorously from the 
above that technical unemployment can be eliminated through time only 
when K is growing at a faster rate than L. If we then let time (t) 
be plotted on the vertical axis (downward) and on the horizontal axis 
(to the left), we can denote the population growth path (in the 4th 
I 
quadrant) and the capital growth path (in the 2nd quadrant). With the 
..~Iv 
l 
laichard S. Eckaus, "The Factor Proportions Problem in Under• 
developed Areas," American Economic Review, September 1955. 
-4-
aid of the 45-degree line in the third quadrant, we can then determine 
the endowment path E
0
, E1, E2 ••• in
 the contour map. It is obvious that 
the endowment path will bend toward the technology line if and only if 
K expands at a faster rate than L. In fact, if this continues over a 
long enough period of time, the endowment path will intersect the tech• 
nology line at a turning point "T". At that point technical unemployment> 
havinr:; fallen from U
O 
to \\ to U2" •• , wi 11 have been eliminated. 
It is easy to provide an algebraic solution to the above. Let 
the population g-row at a constant rate "r", 
1 and let a Keynesian average 
propensity to save "s'' be postulated. Let the capital and labor coeffi­
cients of the unit contour (i.e., that contour which produces one unit of 
output) be k and n, respectively, as shown in Diagram 1. Thus, letting 
n = d~/dt/x stand for the rate of growth of "x", we have
X 
la) (constant population growth rate) 
b) (saving function) 
c) dK/dt=I (investment as the increment to 
capital stock) 
d) Q=K/k (k is the capital-output ratio) 
e) N=Q/n· (n is the labor coefficient snd N 
the emploved labor force) 
f) U=L-N · (technical ~nemploya:ent). 
Now suppose we know that the initial endowment point is at E0 
(with L
0 
units of labor and K
0 
units of capital), below the technology 
line. Since capital is "the" bottleneck factor, the Harrod-Damar model 
1
. 2app 1.es. We can then determine the time path of K,Q and N, and of K/L• 
the endowment path: 
1Exogenously determined; an endogenous population theory could 
be easily accommodated. 
2 .
Notice that (lb, c, d) make up the fam11:tar Harrod•Domar framework.
' 
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(or K=K e(S/k)t) ___________ from)2a) nK=s/k 
o ( /i )t lb)c)d 
b) n =s/k (or Q=Q e s .c ; Q =K /k)------
Q o. 0 0 
c) nifs/k (N=N e (





d) TlK/L=s/k-r; (K/I.;:: f e (S/k-r)t --------from (la,2a) 
0 
Since the slope of the technology line ar is k/n, the turning point1 
I (at T) occurs when the K/L (in 2d) is equal to k/n, i.e., when
I 3) k/n=(K /L )e(S/k-r)t 
or the endowment path intersects the technology line. Solving for "t" 1\ 
0 0 
the time it takes to eliminate the technical unemployment, we have: ' 
4) (for k/n > K /L )I 0 0 
From this equation, we can see the logic of the determination of the ex­• 
I 
tent of unemployment in the context of growth as well as other significant ' 
indicators of growth performance, e.g., whether or not a termination 
I 1point will, in fact, ever be reached; the nature of the per capita in-
j 2 
I 
come growth path; the time path of the "extent" of employment which we 
3 . 4 
may define as N/L; and the time path of u, the amount of unemployment. 
.I 1From (4) we see that a positive solution to "t" exists if and 
only if s/k > r, i.e., nK >n 1° 
2From la and 2b we see that the rate of growth of per capita in• 
come (Q/L) is s/k-r. Hence a country can achieve continuous increases in 
per capita .. income if and only if it is able to eliminate unemployment in 
a finite number of years (see footnote 1). 
3The constancy of the slope of the technology line implies that 
the amount of employment N is growing at the same rate as capital K. 
Hence the extent of employment N/L is growing at the same rate as per 
capita income. 
4Significant questions can be raised with respect to whether U 
declines monotonically or first increases before it declines toward zero 
at the turning point. By differentiating U (in 1£) with respect tot, it 
can be- shown that the time path of U is inverse U-shaped if and only if 
N* (s/k) <r <s/k where N* is the initial extent of employment. On the 
0 0 
other hand, if r > s/k the absolute amount of unemployment increases mono­
tonically and if r <N* s/k it decreases monotonically.
J 0 
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The above Eckaus•related formulation of technical unemployment 
postulates a fairly rigid relationship between the aggregate capital 
stock and aggregate employment and thus undoubtedly exaggerates the extent 
of technological complementarity. However, it does serve to emphasize 
the technology and growth-relevant nature of the unemployment problem in 
the LDC 1s. Our own formulation below, will seek to soften this 
rigidity by emphasizing that the relationship between capital and labor 
is, in fact, continuously modified under the impact of technological 
change. 1 
II. The Transmission of Tschnglqgy 
As we have just pointed out, a major shortcoming of the above view 
of the world is the assumption of the constancy of technology. Most
I• development theorists and empirical workers will readily agree that 
modernization involves much more than physical resource augmentation a 
la Harrod•Domar but is deeply affected by qualitative changes, especially 
changes in technology. 
2 
The basic notion of technological transfer is 
'
I 
based on the recognition that a major source of technological change in
I the developing world derives from the importation of technology from 
the advanced countries. This basically sound notion of long standing3 
I is often paired with the idea, which we also accept, that the blessings 
-I 
~pe sharp distinction between complementDrity and substituta­
bility along a static production function becomes muted when, as in our
case, continuous technological change is admitted.
2s. Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, (Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, 1960) and R. M. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function, 11 ~, August 1957, for example. 
lrhorstein Veblen, "The Opportunity of Japan" in Essays in our





,~ flowing from such technological transmission are
 not unmixed; for the 
so-called 0 modern" technology has been developed in the 
capital-rich, 
labor-scarce mature economy and is not necessarily appro
priate to the 
Instead of generating employment, itfactor endowment of the borrower. 
msy, in fact, create additional unemployment. This prob
lem lies at the 
crux of the controversy concerning the so-called output 
vs. employment 
effects of adopting alternative technologies. 
1 Finally, once we accept 
the possible dangers of an indiscriminate transplantatio
n of technology, 
we are driven to the recognition that the truly signific
ant aspect of such 
a transfer may well lie in its catalytic effect in terms
 of domestic in• 
novative processes. It is the adaptation of imported te
chnology to the 
existing factor endowment, illustLated by the case of hi
storical Japan
2 
which lies at the heart of the matter. Let us now procee
d with a more 
rigorous formulation of these intuitive ideas, building 
on the foundations 
of the simple growth model already presented. 
First, we introduce the notion of a technology shelf, d
eveloped 
and perfected in the mature economies, from which the de
veloping countries 
We have earlier chosen to describe a particular 
I 
are free to borrow. 
technology by an L-shaped unit contour•-defined rigorous
ly by a pair of 
A technology shelf may then be represented byinput coefficients (k,n). 
1w. Ga lens on and H. Leibenstein, "Investment Criteria, Productivity, l 
and Economic Development, 
11 I.XIX (Aug. 1955), 69, 343-70; G. Ranis, "In- · 
vestment Criteria, Productivity and Economic Developmen
t: An Empirical 
Comment, 11 Ouarterlv Journal of E,£.Qnomics, Vol. LXXVI, May
 1962; and J.C.H. 
Fei and G. Ranis, Deve looment of the Labor Surplus Econo
my: Theory and 
Policy, Irwin, 1964.tQ 
J 
2
G. Ranis, "Factor Proportions in Japanese Economic Deve
lopment," 









by the points A 
0
, A1, A2~••• form:i!ng a smooth envelope curve _in Diagram 2. 
An LDC at any point in time is then in a position to borrow a particular 
unit activity from the shelf. This view of technological transfer imme• 
diately raises two questions: (1) how does the shelf come about? and 
(2) by what rules does an LDC borrow from it? 
With respect to the first question, the technology shelf contains 
technologies which have been demonstrated to be feasible in the mature 
economies either at present or at some historical point in the past. We 
may thus view A , A1, A2, ••• as the actual technology of different histori­0 
cal vintages (e.g., A in 1900, A in 1920, and A in 1930••• ) prevailing,0 1 2 
1 say, in the u.s. Thus as we move upward along the shelf, we run into 
more modern technology, i.e., that of more recent vintage. This is re­
presented by an ever increasing capital per head (k/n) (i.e., steeper 
radial lines OA 
0
, OA1, 0A2~•• ) signifying that a typical worker has learned 
to cooperate with more units of capital goods in a society with increasing 
technological complexity. 2 As a result of the gain in proficiency in 
this sense labor productivity increases (i.e., n decreases). This is 
shown by the negatively sloped rectangula;; hyperbola (1/n) in Diagram 2b
1 
the height of which indicates labor efficiency (approximated by labor 
1In the realistic world, there exist, of course, other technology
exporting countries (e.g., Western Eu~ope, Japan••• ) whose historical 
experience would also be SUIIII!larized on the shelfo The same sequence may or 
moy not occur in different historical time periods for each such country. 
2Thus, to us, in a historical sense, a capital deepening pro­
cess is much more complicated than "homogeneous labor being equipped with 
more units of homogeneous capital goods" and is virtually inseparable
from increasing technological complexities being mastered by better 
labor in a learning process. This historical interpretation of our unit 
· contour (i.e., the technology shelf) should be sharply distinguished
from the unit contour of a static production function as ordinarily en­
countered in production theory. 
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productivity) for the corresponding unit technology vertically lined up 
in Diagram 2a. According to this historical view of the technology shelf, 
labor is not a homogeneous entity and the improvement of the quality of 
labor, through education or learning by doing, is essential for the society 
1to master a more advanced state of technolOBY. 
The historical e,~perience of every mature economy, e.g., tne U.S., 
Germany, etc. can be viewed in this way, as demonstrating the existence of 
a particular technological shelf available for borr~~ing. Statistically, such 
a shelf can be constructed from the time series of labor productivity 
• p(t) and capital-output ratio k(t). 2 In case the capital-output ratioI 
I rises with increasine labor productivity--which is the "normal case"-­
I the shelf is negatively sloped; otherwise it is positively sloped. Since 
there are many mature countries, the typical LDC is faced with a multi­
t plicity of such shelves. However, since historically there has been con• 
I tinuous technological transfer among the mature countries it is not un­
I reasonable to postulate the e:cistence of a single technological shelf for• 
the entire mature world, with both contemporary and past vintages repre­
sented. The much discussed technology gap between two mature economies 
at any point in time may then be interpreted as the gap between the 
currently in use technology of any such pair of countries. As far as the 
LDC I s are concerned they simultaneously face a range of technology in 
contemporary use across the mature countries as well as all relevant 
historically experienced technologies. 
lrhus the change of quality of both Kand N over time are, to 
us, essential facets of growth and hence rigorously, our model belongs 
to the family of vintage models. The technology shelf is thus not a pro­
duction function in the ordinary static sense. 
2
These problems have been studied fairly exhaustively, both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds by such people as Solow and Kuznets, 
.212.• ill• 
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The above notion of an increasing skill level of the labor force 
in historical perspective can be depicted in Diagram 2c, with time measured 
on the horizontal axis (to the left). Let the improvement of the quality 
of labor through time be depicted by the labor progress function, given 
exogenously as a historical reality in the mature economy. On the verti­
cal axis we measure p=l/n, labor productivity as a proxy for the level of 
labor efficiency or labor quality. Diagram 2abc thus serves to show 
that the improvement of labor efficiency through time enables workers to 
cooperate with more and more capital goods per head, describing a society 
>• 
I 
reaching ever higher levels of technological complexity. 
In short, the technology shelf came about as a consequence of the 
I historical growth experience of the industrially mature economz involving 
I 
changes in the quality· of labor as well as in technological complexity. 
When an LDC tries to borrow from this shelf in an efficient fashion it 
must be respectful of the same basic discipline. In other words, a 
l wise borrower is constrained by the education and skill attainment levels 
of its own economic agentso Consequently, the progress it is capable of 
making in improving indigenous skill and education levels really con­
stitutes a basic'constraint~on ±bs rate of progress. It is with this unde~­
1 
standing that we approach the analysis of the rules of borrowing.
I 
i 
III. Education and Technologv 
It is clear that the customary sharp contrast between an indus­j 
f trially mature and a developing country is due primarily to the existence 
of a wide technology gap between them, and that the typical LDC; and aid 
givers abroad, are busily trying to narrow this gap by means of technological 
-11-
transfers. When a technology shelf as defined above is postulated the 
phenomenon of continuous technological transfer may be depicted as the 
"climbing upward over time along the technology shelf" so that, through 
time, the unit technology representative of a more recent vintage A , 
0 
A , A ••• (Diagram 2a) will be absorbed by the borrm~er. However, since,1 2 
simultaneously, the industrially mature economy will presumably continue 
to move along its own historical trend of continuous technological change 
and capital deepening, the technology gap will be narrowed if and only 
if the LDC can effectively absorb newer (i.e., more capital using) 
technology at a sufficiently fast rate. It follows that the rules 
governing effective technological transfer.must be closely scrutinized. 
The historical experience of the mature economy--as analyzed in 
the last section--strongly suggests that what determines the rapidity 
of technological borrowing by the LDC is the skill level necessary for 
the mastery of an increasingly modern technology. This may be broadly 
interpreted to relate to the level of labor efficiency, and of public and 
private entrepreneurial skills which are themselves gradually enhanced 
in the course of development. Consequently, using Diagram 2 now for a 
somewhat different purpose, the exogenously given labor progress function 
of Diagram 2c may now be interpreted as that pertaining to the typical 
LDC. A country with a more favorable cultural inheritance and/or success­
ful education policy over time can be represented by a more steeply rising 
labor progress function. It is, in fact, a basic hypothesis of this 
paper that the rapidity of the development of the human resources in this 
sense is causally crucial in at least two important respects to the 
technological transfer problem, i.e., to the rapidity with which foreign 
technology can be borrowed and, second, once borrowed, to the extent to 
-12-
which it can be assimilated via the exercise of domestic innovative in­
genuity. 
In this connection it will prove helpful to distinguish between 
the "pure transplantation case" in which foreign technology is imported 
without further modification, and the case of "technological assimilation" 
in which some domestic innovative effort is made "on top of" the impor­
ted technology. This notion of "assimilation" refers to that vital in­
digenous innovative effort through which the initially "capital using" 
character of imported technology is modified and adapted to make it more 
suitable to the labor rich and capital scarce factor endowment condition 
of the typical LDC. l 
Using Diagram 2, let the developing country's labor progress 
function and the technology shelf available to the LDC be postulated. 
In the case of "pure transplantation" the skill level which has been 
attained at any point in tiCTe causally determines the "vintage" of the 
unit technology which can be borrowedo Thus at time t 1, t 2, ••• the im­





, ••• This also repreeer.ts the effective technology which prevails in 
the LDC at that historical poir.t in timee The underlying justification 
for this "rule of borrowing" is that a unit te~hnology of a more recent 
1such "assimilation," taking the form of multiple shifting,
machine speed-ups, changes in handling and other peripheral activities,
variations in plant size, structure and organization has been documented 
for Japan {Ranis, "Factor Proportions in Japanese Economic Development, 11 
£!.e.• .£.!S..) Mexico {Paul Strassman, Technological Change· and Economic 
Development, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968) and the 
Soviet Union (David Granick, "Economic Development and Productivity
Analysis: The Case of Soviet Metalworking," Quarterlv Journal of 






vintage, or a vintage representing a higher technological complexity, can 
only be mastered when the pertinent domestic "skill level" has been 
achieved. 
Turning next to the more general case, i.e., when borrowing is 
I " accompanied by technological assimilation, the effective unit technolOEY 
at time t 1, t 2, ••• i
n fact turns out to be represented by points B1
, B2, ••
• 
fI.. as shown by the curve labeled "post-assimilation technolocies." In this 
general case, the basic hypothesis is that the domestic ingenuity and 
i skill level achieved at a particular point in time (e.g., t 2) enables the 
t.. 
country not only to import the technology (e.g., A ) of the "correct"2 
I vintage but also to "stretch" the use of that capital resulting in a re••
I duction of the value of the capital coefficient (e.g., to the level in­
~ 
dicated at point B ). In this case, the ratio of the distance A B /B2 2 2
n2 ' 2 
t. in Diagram 2a may be interpreted as the degree of capita 1 stretching, which 
I gives us a quantitative rr2asure of the strength of the indigenous innova­
tive effort aimed at modifying the imported technology. If that effort . 
I 
is weak, the degree of capital stretching may be zero, bringing us bacl~ 
} to the special case of "pure transplantation." 
I Notice that the technology shelf, represented by a negatively 
r 
sloped curve, implies that the importation of more modern technology via 
I 
i pure transplantation, while it leads to increased labor productivity, 
does so only at an increasing capital cost, i.e., an increase in the value 
of the capital-output ratio. In a developing country characterized by 
low saving, capital scarcity and unemployed labor, the transfer of tech­
nology from abroad may thus actually result in increased technical un­
employment and hence a lower value of per capita income (Q/L)--in spite 
-14-
of the fact that labor productivity (Q/N) is raised. This unfavorable 
unemployment effect can, however, be considerably ameliorated by the domes­
tic capital stretching effort, the effect of which is to enable more 
labor to be employed per unit of capital stock. The borrowing of tech­
nology ·which involves a maximum of domestic innovative effort is thus 
clearly superior to the pure transplantation case, The successful Japanese 
growth experience in the nineteenth century and the Korean, Taiwanese 
and Mexican experience in the twentieth have provided ample proof of the 
substantial advantages of the selective importation of technology coupled 
with a major domestic innovative effort. 
The importance of this point is underscored when we recognize 
that the choice may not be simply between the pure transplantation case-­
at the skill level appropriate within the recipient economy-•and borrowing 
with assimilation. It is a fact of life that many contemporary LDC 1s 
are not interested in borrowing anything but the latest vintage technology·• 
quite irrespective of the domestic skill levels they have reached. Some­
times, encouraged by aid 3ivers and _by mistaken domestic policy packages-­
as well as misguided notions of prestige--they thus try to move upward 
along the technology shelf ahead of what is reasonable and efficient, 
given the skill levels they have reached. In such cases the aforemen­
tioned difficulties of the pure transplantation case are exacerbated 
and underlined. 
In summary, the rules of technological borrowing as we have for­
mulated them are based on a one-to-one correspondence between the "skill 
, \} level" attained by a society and the vintage of the technology which can 
be borrowed from the intern~tional shelfa Such a one-to-one relationship 
-
-15-




the degree of technological complexity on the one hand and the degree 
of 
technological competence required to handle it effectively, on the oth
er. 
The optimum and hence natural course to follow in the course of the 
development process is for the two to move in unison and harmony throu
3h 
There is no denying that, in the real world, many a contemporarytime. 
LDC has, in fact, through unwarranted policy measures or otherwise, 
managed to distort this harmony. The attempt to import the latest tec
h­
nology ahead of an economy's human competence levels leads to the esta
b­
lishment of 11 technol0Bica 1 dua lism
11 characterized by the coexistence of 
an extremely modern sector .side by side with traditional technology, w
ith 
The very size of the technological gaplittle interplay between them. 
between these two domestic sectors causes a lack of spill-over charac
teris-
"'
tic of the so-called 
/1big push for modernization effort. The same achieve-
ment of an adequate domestic skill level commensurate with the techno
lo3y 
borrm-1ed also affects the strength of the assimilation effort, i.e., t
he 
degree of capita 1 stretching. Economies which try to borrow ahead of 
their skill level also find it more difficult to assimilate that techn
ology~­
As we shalland thus find themselves two steps removed from the optimal. 
see, the borrowing of technology without the accompanying domestic inn
o­
vative effort toward capital stretching may be very costly in terms o
f 










Technological Transfer and Unemolovrnentr.v• 
Contemporary growth theory has had a pronounced material resources 
orientation and relied heavily on the accumulation of capital as in the 
Harrod-Demar model (see Section I). Increasingly, however, the importance 
of human resources is being recognized, and our arguments in the last 
section have placed considerable emphasis on education, and on technolo• 
gical change via the transmission from rich to poor. We are now ready 
to put these two strands of thought together in.order to formulate a more 
deterministic growth model. This model builds on our earlier work in Sections 
I Dnd II, .· but now includes not only the saving function and popula-
tion growth among its behavioristic assumptions but also the labor progress 
function, the technology shelf and the rules of technological transfer of 
Section III. The purpose of the model is the projection of the time 
path of the growth of output (Q), employmend (N), unemployment (U), capi• 
tal stock (K), as well as of the indicators of technological change, (e.g., 
p, k, and n). 
The deterministic aspect of the model can be easily explained with 
the aid of Diagram 2. Initially at time t=t,
0 
it is the skill level (p)
0 
which determines the effective unit technology (i.e., the point A and 
0 
the technology linear) in a way described in the last section. The 
0 
initial supply of capital stock (K ) then determines the scale of opera­
o 
tion of the technology (at F) the amount of labor which can be accommo• 
0 
dated (N) and the output (Q ). The initial population (L) then serves 
0 0 0 
to determine the volume of unemployment (U ).o The system is thus com• 
pletely determined statistically. In the next period, (t )1 the skill 
level (p ) determines the imported unit technology (A ) which becomes the
1 1 
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effective unit technology (B1) after capital s
tretching (measured by 
the distance A B ). With the aid of the average propensity to save (s) _ 1 1 
and output (Q) we can determine savings and investment I 0=s
Q
0 
in the second 
0 
period and hence the new capital stock (K ). The total population (L )1 1 
is given by the population grO'Wth curve. In this way we can determine 
an emplovment path F , F1, F2, ..
. as well as an endo·ument oath E , E1
, E ;, 
0 0 2 
••• through time, the horizontal gap between the two curves giving us the 
time path of technical unemployment U , UH u2,... It is apparent that 0 
technical unemployment can be eliminated over time when, and only when, 
the endO'Wment path bends upward fast enough to "catch up with" and finally 
1 
intersect the employment path. 
The model which we have constructed is broad enough to include 
in its scope not only the impact of capital accumulation but also that 
of technological change resulting from the improvement of human re­
sources and the availability of impDrtable technologies--dimensions which 
are certainly crucial to the development process. For purposes of statis­
ustical implementation and in order to make it possible for to deduce the 
full implications of the model, we will now proceed with the specifica­
tion of more precise functional forms for our behavioristic assumptions. 
These include the si:c equations of Section I (la-lf) which are accepted, 
with the only provision that k and n (the capital and labor coefficients) 
are no longer constants. Instead their value is determined with the aid 
of the following additional behavioristic equations: 
~he main difference between this model and the model of Section 
I is that instead of a fixed technology line or (Diagram 1) the technology 
line now shifts continuously through time due to technological change 
(i.e., due to technological transfer and assimilation). 
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5a) n p=i or p=p e
it 
0 
where p=l/n (labor progress function;
i is the rate of labor
progress) 
a 1- a Qb) l=j n or j=p for f):;;(1/a)/a (technology shelf; j
is the "imported" pre•
assimilation capital­
output ratio) 
c) ITF j/k (mis the degree of capital stretching) 
d) (capital stretching function; "c11 is the capi•
tal stretching coefficient) 
Taking these one at a time, labor productivity is specified to 
grow at a constant rate 11 i 11 as described by the labor progress function 
(5a). The technology shelf available is depicted by the unit contour of a 
Cobb-Douglas type (Sb). Notice that in this functional form 11 j 11 is the 
initial "imported" capital-output ratio which must be differentiated from 
the "effective" post-assimilation capital-output ratio "k". In (Sc) the 
degree of domestic capital stretching is measured by m=j/k; the higher 
the value of m, which corresponds to a lower value of k, the higher the 
degree of capital stretching. Finally, in (5d), we have postulated a 
capital stretching function which simply states that mis causally deter• 
mined by the cumulative effect of labor progress (p/p ), i.e., the Dlllltiple
0 
by which the current skill level has increased over some initial level. 
The underlying idea here stresses the importance of education and learning 
by doing as causal factors determining the amount of capital stretching 
technological change which can be incorporated in the imported technology. 
Thus there are altogether ten equations (la•f) plus (5a•d) containing 
five behavioristic parameters, (r, s, i, a, c), relevant to our model. 
I 
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The three unfamiliar parameters (i, a, c) are all related to the 
phenomenon of technological change in our model. The rate of labor pro­
0 
cress "i" summarizes the cultural heritage and/or the effectiveness of 
a country's education policy as related to the increase of a nation's 
technological competence. The Cobb-Douglas coefficient· 11 a" in (5b) 
can be viewed as describing the "generosity" or amplitude of the existing 
technology shelf since the elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas function., 
measuring the percentage increase of the capital coefficient (dj/ j) 
per unit percentage decrease in the labor coefficient (dn/n), may be de­
fined as 
6) (pure transplantation cost) 
9 may thus be viewed as a summary statement of the cost, in terms of 
capital use, of importing technology from abroad. The typical LDC will 
want e, which we may call the pure transplantation cost, to be as low as 
possible--for that would mean that a given percentage increase of labor 
productivity (or decrease in the labor coefficient) can be obtained at 
a smaller capital cost, i.e., a smaller percentage increase in the capi• 
t~l-output ratio. Finally,tbe capital stretching coefficient "c" (in 
5d) appears to be a· crucial behavioristic parameter since only when 
it is sufficiently large can domestic innovative effects be counted on 
to contribute significantly to alleviating the unemployment and capital 
shortage creating impact of the initial act of importation of new 
technology. This intuitive interpretation of the various parameters 
used in the model will be reinforced by further deductive reasoning 
below. 
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To solve the entire system, let us combine the various behavioral 
assumptions related to technology change. Starting ~with Sc, we have: ~ 
b7a) k=j/m=a p where 
b) a=p: ; b=9-c; €=(1- a)/ a by (5b) and {5d). 
c) Q=Q KB Nl-B where
0 




(1/ (l-1/c a.)} ••• by (7a) 
Notice that (7c) is deduced directly from (7a) and represents the effec• 
1tive production function which turns out to be in a Cobb-Douglas form. 
However, from (7d) we see that the coefficient "B" of this Cobb-Douglas 
function is defined in terms of 11 a. 11 and "c", reminding us of the crucial 
fact that in a contemporary LDC, the production condition is intrinsically 
a product of importable technology (a) as well as of domestic innovative 
ingenuity (c). Analogous to (6), the elasticity of (7c) i.e., the produc­
tion elasticity is: 
8) b= (1-B)/B=€-c where e= (1- a )/ a., 
which is the difference between Q, the pure transplantation cost, and 
c, the capital stretchin3 coefficient. Since the LDC is better off the 
lower 9 and the higher c, i.e., the lower b, we may think of -b=c-g as 
the "excess" of the domestic capital-stretching effort over the pure 
transplantation costs attending the importation of technology. The larger 
1Notice also that (7c) now becomes a genuine (negatively sloped)
Cobb-Douglas function if and only if O <B < 1. In other cases (i.e.,
o >B or B >1) the production contour becomes positively sloped; then
the unit contour of (7c) is the equation of the effective technology
locus in Diagram 2a. 
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this excess, the more favorable the anticipated growth performance of.· 
the country in question. 
From (7a) and too labor progress .function of (Sa), we can .easily 
deduce the growth path .of a number of interesting variables including 
·the effective capital-output ratio n1c, and--with the aid of the saving 
· function of (lb)--the rate of capital acceleration ( nn ) the growth
K 
rate of capital ( nK), and the growth rate of capital per head (nK/N):1 
9a) n =b n =bi (by 7a; Sa)k p 
b) =- n =-bi (by 2a; 9a)n111t 11 (s/k) k 
c) 11 
l{ 
= n e -bit (by %)
0 -bit
-1 - n /bid) K=K Je where J=e o > 0 
0 
e) 
nK/N =n (Q/9).(N/Q)= nkp = bi+i=i(l+b) = i(1+9-c)=i(l/a-c) (by 8) 
From this it is then easy to deduce the rates of growth and 
the time paths governing all the significant economic variables in the 
system, including output (Q), employment (N), per capita income 
(Q""==Q/L~. the extent of emp lo:y s:r.ent (N'A:N/L): 
-bit10a) (by 9ac)nQ= nK/tt n oe - bi 
b) n N= nQ/P= n Oe 
-bit bi -- i (by lOa, Sa) 
c) ~*= nQ/L= n 0e 
-bit 
- bi - r (by lOa, la) 
•bitd) - bi. - i (by lOb, la) )11 N"k= n N/L= n o e - r 
In this fashion the system is formally and fully determined. Let us .now 
examine the conclusions which flow from an application of this model, be­
fore we turn,.in the final section, to the matter of empirical verifica-. 
l.rbis latter will later help us to distinguish between capital 
deepening and capital shallowing in the developing country. 
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v. Application 
The above_ formulation has hopefully served to convince the 
reader of the rather complicated nature of the LDC unemployment problem 
when compared with its traditional formulation in the context of the 
mature economy. In fact, our model has hopefully shown that the problem 
can only be understood as an integra 1 part of the grevJth process as a 
whole, including as crucial components not only capital accumulation but 
also continuous technological change traced to human skill formation at 
home and technological transmission from abroad. Thus, our model provides 
the insight that the problem of unemployment in an LDC must ultimately 
be resolved in terms of the combined forces of an adequate level of aus­
terity, the creation of the proper educational plnnt--in terms of both 
quality and quantity--,and sufficient ability and willingness to assimilate 
imported technology. These three forces are summarized by the three para­
meters (s, i, c). To the extent that these parameters can be affected by 
budgetary or other policy measures within the LDC they may be regarded 
as 11 instrumenta 1 variables" in the Tinbergen tradition and will be treated 
1 as such in the discussion which follows~ 
Our model enables us to embark on the important analytical task 
of assessing which of these policy instru!Tlents (i.e., s, c, i) should be 
viewed at a higher level of causal order, and hence more crucial for 
development. To begin with, we may take the raising of per capita income 
(Q~Q/L) and the elimination of unemployment (or raising the extent of 
l.rhe other variables.,," a 11 (a property of the technology shelf), 
11r 11and (the population growth rate) may be regarded as beyond the con­
trol of the LDC and will be treated as such in our paper. A population 
theory endogenous to the system could easily be accommodated one.a ap.ain. 
-23-
employment N+.,,-.N/L) as the major twin social objectives. In this connec­
tion, the well-,-10rn assumption of a necessary conflict between these two 
objectives, the output and the employment effect, often associated with 
technological transfer, can perhaps he laid to rest. Equations (10c) and 
(10d), it will be noted, indicate that the rate of growth of both Q* and 
N* are determined by the same terms "bi", in the sense that the condition 
11) b i < 0 (criterion of success) 
].·s both necessary and sufficient for both n nN* to increase''Q~': and 
monotonically and uithout limit in the long run. In other words, :the 
employment effect is favorable (i. e,, nN~" > O) if and only if the output 
effect is favorable (i.e., >Q)--so that these two crucial welfare 
criteria are actually never in conflict. For this reason (11) may be 
interpreted as "the 11 criterion of success, with 11 success" implying a 
1
simultaneous movement in both directions. 
A close~ scrutiny of (11) indicates that since i > 0 (i.e., the 
rate of labor improvement is positive) the criterion of ultimate success 
reduces to b < 0 i.e., 
12) C > Q ,; (1-a. )/o. (by (11), (C) and i ,- o). 
This result represents a conclusion of some importance since it 
pinpoints the facto~s related to technological change which make for 
success in the development efforta In essence, our conclusion is that 
an LDC 1 s gro~~:h per.fo::mance both in terms of employment and output goals 
can be crar..-,ned with success in the long run if and only if the domestic 
innovative capital stretching effort (c) is sufficiently strong to com-
pensate for the high capital cost (9) associated with the modern imported 
10n the other hand, when (11) is not satisfied, both Q* and N* 
will, in general, decline. 
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_ technology. What is surprising about this cone lusion is that the ques­
tion of success seems to depend on technological factors only. The extent 
of population pressure (r), saving capacity (s), and even educational 
performance in terms of labor progress (i) seem to be irrelevant to the 
question of long run success or failure. 
To elaborate on this point, we must note that if (12) is satis­
fied, the rate of labor progress (i) does indeed affect the rapidity of 
the increase of Q* and N*, even if it has no impact on the question of 
whether or not these two welfare criteria will continue to increase with.. 
out limit in the long run. Hence, a faster rate of labor progress 
(larger i) indeed contributes to a more rapid increase of per capita in-
come and of the extent of employment (see lOc., d). Moreover., a lower 
population pressure (smaller r) and a higher averase propensity to save, 
(larger s) also contribute favorably to the m8.2,nitude of both nQ'A' and 
nN*' as we would expect. 
1 
Thus while (c, a ) determine the basic 
qualit!]tive characteristics of the system (i.e., "success" or "failure") 
the other parameters (i, s, r) determine the rapidity of the process. 
Finally, a word may be added with respect to the case of pure 
transplantation defined as the absence of indigenous innovative effort 
in a capital stretching direction "on top of" the imported technology. 
1A closer scrutiny of 10c shows that when r >n - bi and when 
(11) is satisfied the value of Q* decreases at first and
0 then increases 
monotonically after a finite time span. The same U-shaped characteris­
tic can be established for N* when the population pressure is• relatively 
high, i.e., when r > n - bi - i. Notice that the saving parameter 
11s11 enters into (10) d~rough the initial value of the rate of growth 
of capital n =s/k0 where k0 is the initial capital-output ratio. 
Thus a high sgving rate also contributes favorably to the rapidity of 
the growth of Q* and N*. 
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ThiS turns out to be a special case of (12) defined by c=o, in which 
case the criterion of success is reduced to 
13) < 0 (criterion of success for c=o) 
In this special case "success" can occur if and only if the unit 
contour of Diagram 2a is positively sloped. 1 Specifically, this means 
that, as the process of development unfolds in the mature economy, in­
creasing labor productivity (p) through time must have been accompanied 
by a sustained decrease of the capital-output ratio (k). Condition (13) 
permits us to conclude that when a particular LDC fails to develop the 
ability to engage in indigenous innovative effort, the only way in which 
it can still be successful is by being in a position to borrow from a 
mature economy shelf which itself benefitted from capital-saving innova­
. 2tions over time. Empirical studies on this subject are by no means 
agreed, but they have shown that the capital-output ratio in the mature 
country seems to have undergone long swings in both upward and downward 
directions. 3 
In any case, the importance of relying on one's own indigenous 
innovative capacity has been illustrated. In fact, the most crucial 
element of a successful development strategy, both in terms of output 
and employment effects, is clearly the stren3th of this indigenous 
1From (5b) we see that dj/dp=QpQ-l so that the shelf if posi•
tively sloped if and only if f) < O. ·see Section II above for a 
fuller discussion of what determines the slopes of the technology shelf. 
2Here "capital-saving" is taken to mean only that the capital.. 
output ratio has been declining through time. 
3See W. Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activitv, 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1956). 
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innovative effort as induced by and responsive to the importation of 
technology. This involves, inter~, the ability to resist the tempta­
tion to invariably import the "latest" available technology, as well as 
to refrain from stickinr; with outmoded handicraft production. It is 
essential, from the point of view of the spill-over effects achieved 
as a result of the initial importation, that pure transplantation take 
place at a point in keeping with the technological maturity and entre­
preneurial ability of the recipient's human resources. Only in thisfashion 
can the use of the. relatively abundant factor, labor, be sufficiently 
enhanced and that of the relatively scarce factor, capital, economized. 
While the more traditional, material resource-oriented development effort, 
impinging on saving and population growth behavior, must continue to be 
viewed as helpful, policy and budgetary planning to encourage the re­
quisite do~estic innovative effort is crucial. Assisning a priority 
role to the government's creation of the required overheads, including 
education, and to fashioning the proper policy mix vis-a-vis the private 
sector to foster the fullest possible development of domestic entre­
preneurship, may be cited as among the key development issues. The priu:e 
historical example of a country which seems to have solved this problem 
admirably is the case of post-Restoration Japan. Let us now turn to an 
analysis of the growth experience of that country in the light of our 
model. 
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VI. Empirical Analysis 
It is, by now, a well accepted fact that the modernization of 
Japan since the Meiji Restoration was conspicuous -for its· e~hasis••tln 
education and the assimilation of Western technologies. 1 In. spite- of the 
soundness of these notions, the relationship between education and the 
assimilation of technology, on the one hand, and economic development, 
on the other, have, up to now, resisted rigorous analysis within the 
framework of a comprehensive growth model. It is the purpose of this 
section to fill this gap by implementing our model with the help of 
historical data for Japan. 
The essential task of statistical implementation is to estimate 
the numerical values of the five parameters (c, i, a, s, r) of our 
model. Succinctly, the equations which will be used for this purpose are
,,.. ~it14a) p=p 
0 
e (by 5a) 






d) (by 7b)a= 1-M,+c-I • 
-- e) L=L e-'tt (by la)
0 
/\f) I=sQ (by lb) 
11where a hat n ,.._ denotes a parameter estimated by the method of least 
squares. The estimation of (i, r, s) and p
0 
is given by 14aef--for which 
the time series of output (Q), saving (S), population (L) and labor 
1Anthony Tang, "Research and Education in Japanese Agricultural
Development: 1880-1930," Economic Studies Ouarterlv, XIII (Part I:
Feb. 1963; Part II: May 1963). See also dissertation in progress at
Yale University by Gary Saxonhouse, "Basic Determinants of Improvements
in the Efficiency of Production in the Japanese Cotton Textile Industry,
1830-1940." 
• • • • 
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~. 
productivity p (=Q/N) for the whole economy are required. If we have, 
in addition, the time series of capital stock (K), we can estimate "a11 
and "b" in (14b) with the aid of the time series of k (the observed 
capital output ratio) and p. We can then use (14cd) to compute "c" and 
11 a 11 • Thus, a 11 the parameters can be estimated when the time series 
of Q, N, K, L, and Sare available. 
The basic data for Japan, for Q,K,L and N for the period 187G• 
1939J. are presented in columns 1-5 of Tab le l I from which the time series 
of p=Q/N (column 6), k=K/Q (column 7) and s=(dK/dt)/Q (column 8) are 
derived. The time series of "p" and "k" and t~ scatter diagram between 
them are given in Diagrams 3, 4 and 5, i_n which. the · curves (fitted by 
the method of least squares) are also shown. The coefficients of the re• 
gression curves of these diagrams may be summarized as follows: ..,.
1.t A15a) p=p " e where p = 66.36; -i = • 035 0 0 
A bit Ab) k=k 
0 
e where k 
0 
= 2. 57; bi= -. 0065 
A I'!-"' '1;c) K=a p where a = 6. 006; b = -.199 1 
We can then estimate parameters (a, c) in (14c,.d} as follaw&t 
,,.... ,,..
16a) c=ln a/ln p = .427 (by 15a, c)
0 
1b) a= = .D14 (by lSc, 16a)l+b+c 
These are the two parameters in terms of which the criterion of success 
of equation (12) is defined. To see the economic implications of these 
results, we observe: 
17) (1.a )/a < c < 1/<X , 1.·.e., 229 < 427 < 1 229 
1(15b) follows from (9a). We can use (15a and b) to estimate 
b=bi/i=-.0065/.035=-.19 which is consistent with the estimate of 
b in (15c). 
TABLE I 
BASIC JAPANESE DATA 































1664. 00 4461 36649 19542 CS.15 2.631 • 0325 
.J881 1533. 00 4515 36965 19083 77.10 2. 945 • 0274 
t1882 1473. 00 4557 37259 20224 72.83 3. 094 • 0597 
















































































































































































































































































































BASIC JAPANESE DATA (Cont'd) 
Output=Q Capital=K Population Ernp loyment p=Q/N k=K/Q s=I/Q 
=L =N 
(.2.2 (3) (4) (5) _fi,j !72 (C) 





































































































































1939 20584. 84 33327 70050 31780 6l:-7. 73 1.619 • 12l}~ 
Sources: Output data, in millions of yen, (column 2) are from Ohkawa, The Growth 
Rate of the Jaoanese Economv Since 1878 1 p. 247 1 Table 3, and are de-
flated by Ohkawa's general price deflator, p. 130, converted to a 193l~-36 base. 
Capital stock estimates, in millions of yen, 193l~-36 prices (column 3) 
are from Estimates of Lonrr-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 106G, 
Vol. 3, pp. 149-151, Total Net Capital Stock excluding Residences. 
Population data, in thousands of persons, (column l:.) are from Hundred-
Year Statistics of the Japanese Economv, published by the Statistics 
Department of the Bank of Japan. 
Employment data, in thousands of persons, (column 5) are from Ohkawa, 
<£2• .ill•), p. 145 with "total gainfully occupied population" serving 




This permits us to conclude (1) that the historical experience of 
Japan represents a case of success. This means that the domestic effort 
in the direction of capital stretching was sufficiently strong to com• 
pensate for the unfavorable effects of the highly capital using nature 
of the imported technology. We can thus explain why the twin criteria 
Q* and N* increased continuously in the long run in the Japanese case. 
(2) From equation (9e) above, we can see that, if i > o, the development 
process is characterized by capital shallowing (i.e., declining capital 
per head) if and only if c > 1/ a. This means that the domestic capital 
stretching effort is so pronounced that it swamps the initial capital 
deepening effect of imported technologies leading to a net lower effec­
tive capital output ratio. Our results summarized in the second in­
equality in (17) however, indicate that the domestic capital stretching 
effort was not strong enough to guarantee capital shallowing. This 
means that for the sixty years as a whole Japan developed successfully 
d . . o .under con itions f some capita 1 deepening.. l 
The Japanese data moreover reveal that II a" in (16b) lies between 
o and 1. This depicts the case of a negatively sloping technology shelf 
1 i+b bFrom 15c we have d(K/N)/dp=d(k•p)/dp=d(ap /dp=a(l+b)p. 
Hence capital deepening occurs when a >o, and b > •1, which is our case. 
This evidence, of course, does not necessarily indicate that capital
stretching could not have been sufficiently strong over a more limited 
period eo result in capital shallowing. In Fei and Ranis (£a.£.!!..)
Chapter 4, we, in fact, presented some statistical evidence that, for the 
industrial sector, capital shallowing gave way to capital deepening
around 1917. Since the possibility of "capital stretching" is greater,
the greater the difference between the imported and the indigenous tech­
nology, it stands to reason that at the early stages of development 
u~hen presumably, the domestic production structure differs more from 
the foreign technology than at a later stage) the role of capital stretching
is greater. This hypothesis can be verified by a more systematic 
statistical investigation than we have undertaken here, i.e., by placing




which in turn means that Japan was borrowing technology from a 
mature world which had shown some tendency for a secula-1:'ly increasing 
capital output ratio. 1 This also means that Japan could not have been 
successful in its development effort without a major domestic capital 
stretching innovative effort. This conclusion follows rigorously from 
the success criterion of (13), i.e., when c=o. 
As a second type of empirical verification of our theory, we 
can compute the "predicted" values of the growth path of Q~t and N* based 
on (lOc,d) using the above estimated parameter values. To begin ,~ith, 
we can compute the predicted rate of growth of the capital output ratio 
and of the rate of capital acceleration: 
18a) nk=ib=i((l-a)/ a-c)=-.00696" (by 9a, 7b, 15a and 16a,b)2 
b) n =-ib=. 00696 
n K 
While, in our model, the average propensity to save (s) was assumed to 
be constant, (see lb), an investigation of the actual time path of "s" 
for Japan yields the following: 
19) where g=. 0121 
so that the propensity to save in Japan actually shows an annual increase 
of about one per cent a year. Consequently, our model can be modified 
by computing the rate of capital acceleration as 
20) (by 19 and lOa). 
~bus, an examination of purely Japanese data permits us to con• 
elude that the capital output ratio in the advanced countries must have 
been increasing during the period 1388-1930. This phenomenon can of 
course be verified by independent evidence. Fellner, for example, in 
Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity, (New York: 1956) sees the 
capital-output ratio for the U.S. rising slightly between 1370 and 1900, 
fairly constant between 1900 and 1930, and slightly falling thereafter. 
2The directly observed ~lue of "nk" from (15b) is -. 0065 which 
is seen to be very close to the predicted value. 
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On the other band, using columns (3) and (8), of Table 1, we can cal-
cu late the "observed" rate of capital acceleration:
'1it 1;
21) nK= noe where h=.019 
which is precisely the same as the predicted value above when the more 
realistic propensity to save is assumed. 
We can now, moreover, proceed to computing the time paths of 
n Q* and n in (lCc, d):N* 
• 019t
22a) nQ*-.- 0171e + .0075 = n eht + h - r
• 019t 0 
n - eb) N*-.0171 • 0275 = 11 
0 
eht + h - i - r 
From these equations we see not only that Japan can be predicted to be 
successful but that the values of the two above welfare indicators can 
be expected to monotonically increase throughout. 1 This shows that the 
innovative effort in Japan was sufficiently strong to overcome the rela• 
tively modest pressure of population growth. Thus our model coincides 
with actual Japanese historical experience~with both per capita income 
and the degree of employment monotonically increasing through time. 
The above conclusion leads directly to the last empirical appli• 
cation of our paper, namely the computation of a numerical value for the 
"turning point" in Japanese development. Such a "turning point" is 
operationally defined as the time when Japan got rid of 'r, -.r technical 
unemployment, i.e., the employment path and the endowment path finally 




e0 /e 0 where 
b) u= ( n /h) eht + (h-i-r )t for
0 
c) h= • 019; n = • 0171, i=. 035, r=. 0115
0 
1In other words, Q* and N*, for Japan, are increasing from thevery beginning and do not exhibit the possible U•shaped characteristicreferred to earlier. 
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The data when technical unemployment is eliminated can then be obtained 
by solving for "t" when N-:\-:1 in (23a). Unfortunately, we do not have 
much confidence in the estimates of the initial, extent· of technical un• 
employment in 1878, i.e., N*~--but we can safely assume that it varied 
. 0 
between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the total labor force. Applying 
(23a, b), we- can then-obtain the following results by approximation: 
Initial degree of employment: .9 .8 
(N* in 1870)
0 
Duration of unemployment phase, t: 53 5G 
(years) 
Calendar Year (1878 + t) 1931 1936 
This gives us a 11 turnin3 point in the 19301 s -which seems to be supported 
1by other independent work on Japan. 
JI 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that a comprehensive theory 
of growth for less developed countries not only relates employment and un• 
employment to all the other customary growth phenorr.ena at the aggregative
i level, but must also tie up with the nature of the technology available 
I for borrowing from abroad. Such a general explanatory framework, of course, should not only be capable of explaining historical experience 
I but also have substantial implications for planning and policy-making. 
I We have only scratched the surface in both respects. But the preliminary results presented here do seem to provide considerable encouragement for 
I 1 see K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture in 
Modern Japanese Economic Development, 11 Economic Development and Cultural·-1 ('. Change. October 1960 and R. Minami, "The Turning Point in the Japanese 
Economy," Ouarterlv Journal of Economics, August 1966. 
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further exploration, in particular into a) the nature of the relationship 
t,etween technological borrowing and lending countries at different sta3es 
of development; b) the precise meaning of the technological gap and 
Veblen's advantage to the late-comer nation; and c) the impact of 
different internal patterns of historical growth· in the rich countries 
on the development process in the less developed world. 
(b) {a)j K·(capi'ral) 
( I ) 
Growth Path 
.,..,- Populettion_i; ______ - - - --· _____ ""'. ___ \ Growth· Paih 
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